Using an estimated dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model, I show that shocks to a common international stochastic trend explain on average about 10% of the variability of output in several small developed economies. These shocks explain roughly twice as much of the volatility of consumption growth as the volatility of output growth. Country-speci…c disturbances account for the bulk of the volatility in the data. Substantial heterogeneity in the estimated parameters and stochastic processes translates into a rich array of impulse responses across countries.
Introduction
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Two observations motivate this paper. To begin with, one apparent lesson from the so-called Great Recession is that some countries have been more vulnerable than others.
This asymmetry could not be better exempli…ed by the diverging fortunes of two developed small open economies (SOEs) such as Belgium and Spain. While the …rst country started its recovery in the …rst quarter of 2010, the former one was still coping with the worst of the recession. This empirical observation is, thus, a tale of heterogeneity: Structural di¤erences are responsible for heterogeneous business cycles across countries. Hence, the inclusion of country-speci…c components in our formulation can potentially reveal whether distinct business cycles arise from country di¤erentials in preferences, technology, shocks, or all of them.
The second equally intriguing observation is that most countries (developed and developing) moved into the Great Recession with surprising synchronization. For example, by the third quarter of 2009, 25 out of 30 OECD countries experienced negative growth for two or more consecutive quarters. 1 This synchronization tells us a story in which international shocks bu¤eting countries worldwide play a key role. Assessing the relative importance of this common disturbance is a goal of this paper.
There is substantial empirical evidence suggesting the existence of a world factor that drives international ‡uctuations. Examples of this research agenda include, among others, Kose et al. (2003) , Stock and Watson (2005) , and more recently Canova and Ciccarelli (2009). 2 All these manuscripts uncover the presence of a common (world) shock, although its economic importance varies from study to study. The beauty behind these papers is that they are based on ‡exible reduced-form time-series formulations. This simplicity, however, blurs the economic interpretation of the uncovered disturbances.
But providing a structural analysis of the country-speci…c and common shocks is of special importance from a policy point of view. If, for instance, the common international disturbance explains a large proportion of the domestic ‡uctuations and arises from, say, technology changes, then e¤orts to mitigate domestic market imperfections may be of 1 According to the International Finance Statistics database, out of 58 countries for which there is GDP information for 2009, 70% of them experienced a contraction for two or more consecutive periods. 2 The estimation of world factors has also been addressed in important contributions by Stockman (1988) , Norrbin and Schlagenhauf (1996) , Gregory et al. (1997) , Clark and Shin (2000) , and Koren and Tenreyro (2007) .
limited scope or even result in ine¢ cient outcomes. In contrast, such policy e¤orts may be of some bene…t if domestic volatility is mostly driven by country-speci…c disturbances.
To study international business cycles, this paper proposes and estimates a tractable open economy model rich enough to allow for country-speci…c disturbances as well as common international factors for several countries around the world. The model incorporates elements such as tradable and nontradable sectors, which help explain the dynamics of real exchange rates found in the data. Methodologically, the paper shows how to express the likelihood function of an open economy model with both common factors and several idiosyncratic shocks. As will become clear, the proposed approach e¤ectively blends ideas from two strands of the literature: dynamic factor analysis (Stock and Watson, 1993 ) and DSGE models (Christiano et al., 2005) . Tractability in the model hinges on three fundamental suppositions. To begin with, an essential premise is that co-movement among countries is due to a common stochastic productivity trend. Second, the estimation exercise considers seven developed economies, and each of them is treated as an SOE. 3 The advantage behind this assumption is that trade ‡ows of a given country with the rest of the world are summarized by the country's foreign asset position. This e¤ectively reduces the dimensionality of the model. Finally, based on the empirical …ndings in Chang and Fernandez (2010) and Garcia-Cicco et al. (2010) , the country-speci…c factors are identi…ed as preference, interest rate, sectoral-speci…c factor productivity, and terms-of-trade disturbances. Furthermore, the models for the seven countries are jointly estimated using Bayesian methods.
An alternative to the proposed SOE framework would be to work with a multi-country DSGE model. Such an approach would allow us to fully characterize the multiple interactions among countries around the world. This speci…cation, however, su¤ers from the curse of dimensionality, i.e., the size of the model grows with the number of countries. Estimating such a model with more than two countries is computationally challenging. It is for this reason that reduced-form models have been widely favored to extract international business cycles (Kose et al., 2008) .
The substantive …ndings of this paper can be summarized as follows. First, the model successfully accounts for the heterogeneous business cycles in the data, such as New Zealand's large ‡uctuations, the excess volatility of consumption in Norway, or the volatile patterns of real exchange rates. More interesting, this asymmetry in business cycles arises 3 The countries in the sample are Australia, Belgium, Canada, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, and Sweden.
3 from di¤erences in the countries'idiosyncratic disturbances as well as structural features, such as habit formation. The diversity in the parameter estimates in turn translates into a rich array of impulse responses across countries.
Second, the estimation exercise reveals the presence of a common stochastic productivity trend. Innovations to this trend are mildly persistent and explain about the same fraction of the variability of the growth rates of output and investment. Interestingly, those shocks explain roughly twice as much of the volatility of consumption growth as the volatility of output growth. On average, innovations to the common trend account for about 10% of the volatility of output growth in the sample. More pointedly, 16% of the output growth volatility and 37% of the variability of the growth rate of consumption in Australia are accounted for by the common trend. This estimated common factor closely tracks the average growth rates of output and (in particular) of consumption in the SOEs.
Third, country-speci…c preference and technology innovations account for a large fraction of the volatility in the data. For instance, these disturbances together explain 68%
and 74% of the volatility of consumption in Spain and Sweden, respectively. A novel feature of this paper is the analysis of the interaction between international prices and common/country-speci…c disturbances. Along this dimension, I …nd that more than 40% of the dynamics of real exchange rates in all countries is captured by idiosyncratic termof-trade shocks. In contrast, common international disturbances have little impact on real exchange rates. Finally, I …nd that all these results are present even after introducing a country-speci…c trend or an international demand shock.
A key contribution of this paper is to underscore the heterogeneity among countries and how it a¤ects the propagation of common shocks. In this sense, one could argue that (to the extend that) the recent …nancial crisis was common to all countries but that its impact is entirely speci…c to each economy. To see this point, note that the posterior estimates for cost of adjusting investment substantially vary across countries. Spain, for example, displays an adjustment cost 14% larger than that present in Belgium. Furthermore, I …nd that the former economy is more exposed to the international factor. Ultimately, these real frictions induce inertia in the economy, which may help understand why the pace of the recovery in Spain has been signi…cantly faster than in Belgium. 4 Because of its analysis of structural shocks on open economy models, this paper relates to the business cycle literature in SOEs (Aguiar and Gopinath, 2007; and FernandezVillaverde et al., 2011) . The estimation of a structural model with temporal and crosssection data shares some commonalities with the panel data estimation literature (Woodridge, 2002 ). This paper is also close in spirit to the contributions of Boivin and Giannoni (2006), Canova et al. (2007) , and Taylor (1993) . Similar to Boivin and Giannoni's research, this paper estimates a DSGE model with multiple time series. The main di¤erence is that while my study is concerned with extracting a factor common to several countries, they are interested in the e¤ects of a large database on the estimation of closed economy DSGE models. The analysis in this paper is close to Canova et al.'s Bayesian panel VAR analysis in that we analyze international business cycles by decomposing them into common and country-speci…c shocks. Whereas I concentrate on the economic interpretation of these innovations, Canova and coauthors study the stability across time of this decomposition.
Taylor (1993) estimates a reduced-form open economy model for the G7 countries. The key discrepancies between our studies are: 1) his approach is nonstructural, and 2) unlike my approach, he estimates the model on a country-by-country basis, which rules out a common factor among the countries in his sample. 5 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section provides some evidence on the presence of a common component in several developed SOEs. Section 3 describes the baseline model. The computation and estimation of the model are outlined in Sections 4 and 5. Finally, Sections 6 and 7 discuss the results and some extensions.
Trends and Cycles in Developed SOEs
To motivate the discussion to follow, the top panel in Figure 1 displays per-capita real GDP in several developed economies (see Section 5 for details on the data). For comparison purposes, the series are normalized to 0 in the …rst quarter of 1980 (the solid dark line corresponds to the average of the series). A visual inspection of this …gure suggests that recessions and expansions tend to equally a¤ect SOEs. For example, the recession of the early 1990s a¤ected all countries, albeit in di¤erent degrees. Whereas Canada and New 5 My research also relates to the IMF's Global Integrated Monetary and Fiscal project (GIMF; Kumhof et al., 2010) . Although our studies are structural, they di¤er in two dimensions. First, the GIMF model allows for direct trade linkages among several countries whereas in my study those linkages are indirect through adjustments in the country's foreign debt position. Second, contrary to my approach, the large scale nature of the GIMF project makes an estimation exercise quite challanging. Hence, their model is calibrated.
Zealand were severely beaten by that crisis, Norway emerged almost unscathed from the economic downturn. More important, SOEs seem to track each other over the years.
For instance, although Spain was growing above the countries average in the early 1990s
and Norway grew faster in the latter part of that decade, their output trends tend to converge by the year 2010. Similarly, Sweden was growing below trend during most of the 1990s, but its output quickly recovered at the onset of the new century. Together, these casual observations suggest that real GDP in developed SOEs may be co-integrated and consequently share common components. 6 The HP-…ltered business cycles (bottom left panel in Figure 1 ) con…rm that output in the SOEs tends to closely co-move over the cycle. The …gure also reveals some interesting di¤erences across countries. For example, New Zealand, Norway, and Sweden are more volatile than the other economies in the sample. Furthermore, output in Norway seems countercyclical relative to the other countries in the last part of 1980s. The HP-…ltered series also make clear that the countries were severely a¤ected by the recent economic crisis. Indeed, all economies moved to a recession with surprising synchronization in 2009.
The …nal panel in Figure 1 portrays the quarterly growth rates of output found in the data. The new plot reinforces our previous …nding of substantial co-movement among countries over the past two decades. This synchronization suggests that developed SOEs may share not only a stochastic trend but also a common factor that exclusively works at the business cycle frequencies. In sum, the data reveal three important patterns, which will play a fundamental role in shaping the rest of the paper. First, the developed economies in the sample have exhibited similar trends over the past 30 years. Second, even at the business cycle frequencies, real GDP shows correlation across countries. Finally, there is heterogeneity among the SOEs studied in this paper.
Model
In the spirit of Gali (2008) 6 solution of the model, since there is no need to account for the speci…c interactions of country j with, say, country j 0 . Crucially, it is assumed that all countries share a common stochastic trend (this premise will be relaxed momentarily). There are, however, several shocks that are country-speci…c. These assumptions are intended to capture the salient features reported in the previous section while making the solution and estimation of the model feasible. In what follows, I will describe the government and the problems faced by households and …rms in country j. For clarity, variables/parameters not indexed by j are common to all SOEs.
Households
Each SOE is populated by a continuum of households. They choose on consumption baskets of tradable goods (produced at home and abroad) and nontradable goods, labor, investment, capital, and purchases of foreign bonds based on the utility function
Note that the model displays external habit formation with parameter b and that intertemporal decisions are bu¤eted by the country-speci…c disturbance j;t . The consumption bundle, C j , consists onnf a tradable bundle, C j;T , and a nontradable good, C j;N . The tradable basket in turn is composed of goods produced at home, C j;H , and abroad, C j;F .
Here, a H and a F are the weights on the consumption of the domestically and foreign produced goods, respectively (a F = 1 a H ). Similarly, a T and a N are the shares of the traded bundle and the non-traded good in the consumption basket (a N = 1 a T ). The presence of nontradable goods follows the growing evidence that such an assumption improves the model's predictions regarding the dynamics of exchange rates and consumption (Engel and Wang, 2011). Let P H , P F , and P N be the prices of the tradable good, the foreign good, and the nontradable good, respectively (where there is no risk of confusion and to improve readability, I will suppress the country index). Then the consumption-based price indices
The household's budget constraint is given by P H;t C H;t + P F;t C F;t + P N;t C N;t + e P H;t I H;t + P F;t B H;t+1 1 + r j;t W t h t + R k;t K t + P F;t B H;t ;
where B H;t+1 is a bond that promises one unit of the foreign tradable good tomorrow; R k;t is the return on capital; W t is the wage rate in country j. As in Corsetti et al. (2008), e P H;t is both the price of a unit of investment and the wholesale price of a unit of the home made tradable good. The interest rate at which domestic residents borrow/save abroad is:
The second expression on the right-hand side corresponds to the cost of adjusting the debtto-output ratio from its steady state value, b
[j]
H (this cost is needed to close the model; see Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe, 2003). The price index p j;y is the steady-state relative price of GDP, Y j;t (see below). For convenience, it is assumed that households take as given the cost of borrowing from abroad, i.e., B j;H;t+1 is beyond their in ‡uence. Furthermore, domestic residents also face a premium, j;t , when borrowing from foreign markets. Capital evolves according to
Here the adjustment cost is given by S
where g j is the steadystate growth rate in country j. The functional form is based on Christiano et al. 's (2005) …nding that this speci…cation is well suited to match the dynamics of investment.
Firms
Domestic …rms produce traded and nontraded goods. Tradable goods producers use capital and labor to produce according to the technology 
to to maximize pro…ts e P N;t Y N;t W t h N;t R k;t K N;t . Production at home is a¤ected by the stationary technology shocks A N;t and A H;t . In the baseline formulation, the nonstationary productivity disturbance X j t also bu¤ets domestic production. This disturbance has a country-speci…c trend, X d;j t , and a second trend shared with other countries, X w t . As a result, country j evolves along the trend:
which implies that the growth rate in country j is g
assumed that each country grows at the same rate in steady state:
implies g d;j = g. Although this assumption is made for tractability reasons, it also captures the notion that countries grow along the same balanced growth path in the long run.
Identi…cation of the common and country-speci…c trends can be grasped by a two-step approach. In the …rst step, the common trend, X w t , is identi…ed by the average behavior of all variables in all countries in the sample. Intuitively, the weight, [j] , in equation (4) is a measure of country j's exposure to this international stochastic trend. Conditional on this common factor, the idiosyncratic trend, X d;j t , captures departures in country j's growth path from the one dictated by international considerations. Note that the proposed speci…cation is rich enough to capture polar cases such as when the SOE j is exclusively driven by domestic factors (
[j] = 1) or when the common trend entirely dictates the growth at country j (
Following Burstein et al. (2006), there are distribution costs, which induce a wedge between the retail price of tradable goods (P H and P F ) and their wholesale price ( e P H and e P F ). It is assumed that delivering one unit of tradable goods to consumers demands units of the nontradable goods. If we assume that the distribution sector is populated by competitive …rms, then the retail and wholesale prices are given by
Because of the distribution sector, the law of price price holds at the wholesale level but not at the consumer level.
The functional forms (2) and (3) 
Stochastic Processes
The growth rate of the common trend, g w t , follows
For future reference, denote g [%] 100 log g as the average growth rate in percentage points. Similarly, the country-speci…c growth rate is log g
The stochastic processes driving the remaining four idiosyncratic shocks are:
The shocks " ;t are assumed to be independent normally distributed with mean 0 and variance 1.
Equilibrium
As in Mendoza (1995) , it is assumed that 1) the foreign (importable) good is the numeraire, and 2) the relative price of the domestically produced traded good is exogenously determined in world markets. In particular, let e p H;t e P H;t = e P F;t follow an exogenous AR (1) process: log e p j H;t =
ph " j ph;t . These normalizations in turn imply that the domestic household's budget constraint is
A lowercase price refers to the price of that good relative to the numeraire. For example, w t and r k;t are the price of labor and capital in terms of the imported good. The presence of distribution costs implies that the relative price of the foreign commodity at the retail level ( p F;t = P F;t = e P F;t ) is di¤erent from 1. With this convention, the real exchange rate in country
. Clearly, movements in the real exchange rate arise from variations in the terms of trade (through its e¤ect on the price of tradable goods), and ‡uctuations in the markets for tradable goods produced at home and nontradable goods.
These ‡uctuations may result from (country-speci…c or common) productivity shocks or demand related innovations. Finally, domestic GDP is de…ned as in Mendoza (1995) :
This de…nition captures the observation that the traded sector output in developed economies accounts for about one-half of the total GDP.
An equilibrium is de…ned in the standard way: Given a set of prices fp H;t ; p F;t ; p N;t ; e p H;t ; r j;t ; w t ; r k;t g, the allocations fC H;t ; C F;t ; C N;t ; I H;t ; B H;t+1 ; h t ; h H;t ; h N;t ; K t ; K H;t ; K N;t ; Y H;t ; Y N;t g maximize the household's utility, maximize the …rms'pro…t problem, and satisfy the economy's resource constraints.
Maximizing behavior by households and …rms imposes the following …rst order conditions:
e t = E t e t+1 r k;t+1 + (1 ) e t+1 ;
e t e p H;t = e t S 0 t
Here, the multipliers associated with the household budget constraint and the capital accumulation equation are e t and e t , respectively.
As we will see momentarily, the benchmark model is su¢ ciently rich to account for the dynamics of the data. Indeed, adding other features such as a common demand shock or a common transitory technology disturbance has little impact on the main predictions from the benchmark model.
Likelihood with One Common Factor
This section shows how the likelihood of the model with one common factor can be evaluated via the Kalman …lter. Let us start by noticing that the solution to the log-linearized version of the stationary model for country j can be represented as
where A lowercase variable corresponds to a de-trended (stationary) variable, c t = C t =X t , while a hat indicates log-deviations from the steady state. The matrices , , and depend on the structural parameters of each country. The structure behind j;t allows us to disentangle the ‡uctuations in the SOE j due to the common factor -represented here by the shock " g;t -from those due to country-speci…c conditions represented by the shocks " 
where N is the number of countries in the sample, N c = dim (Y j;t ), N s = dim S j;t , and N sh = dim j;t . Then the state-space representation of the model with N countries is
With this formulation in hand, the Kalman …lter can be used to evaluate the likelihood of the model. Since there are …ve observables per country (growth rates of output, consumption, and investment, interest rates, and the growth rate of exchange rates) and four country-speci…c shocks, the state-space model does not require measurement errors (the technical appendix shows the forms of the matrices F, H, and ). , grows with the number of countries and observables to be explained. All these sources amount to increasing the dimensions of F, H, and , which is problematic since the Kalman …lter requires multiplying and inverting objects that depend on those matrices. The larger those matrices are, the more expensive the evaluation of the likelihood function is.
Assuming an SOE framework e¤ectively controls the dimensionality problem by limiting N c , N s , and N sh , i.e., containing the model's complexity. However, such an assumption does not preclude the …rst and third sources of dimensionality from happening. To control for those sources, we restrict our study to explain output, consumption, investment, interest rates, and exchange rates in seven developed SOEs. Even after these restrictions, the expanded state vector, S t , has a dimension of 120; an extra country increases the number of states in S t by 17, while an extra disturbance increasesfs its size by 7.
Let j denote the set of all structural parameters in country j. Operationally, the following steps are used to evaluate the likelihood of the system (8):
1. For country j, solve the DSGE model using j as the relevant parameters.
2. Using the model's solution, build the matrices [j] , [j] , [j] , and P [j] as shown in the technical appendix.
3. Repeat steps 1 and 2 for all countries in the sample.
4. Finally, compute the state representation (8) and build its likelihood, L, using the Kalman …lter.
Although this section shows how to evaluate the likelihood function with only one common factor, which corresponds to the stochastic trend in Section 6, it can be easily extended to allow for multiple common factors (Section 7.3).
Before proceeding to the next sections, it is important to state some potential shortcomings associated with the proposed methodology. One concern regarding the model arises from the lack of explicit trade ‡ows of the SOEs with one another and with large economies. This lack of terms-of-trade e¤ects implies that all cross-dynamics are attributed to the common shock. To the extent that spillovers are present in the data, the estimated common shock is most likely upward biased. This is of some concern since our sample includes Australia and Canada, which have strong trade links with Japan and the United States, respectively, and European countries, which trade signi…cantly with one another.
Technology is hardly the only driver of international business cycles. Other potential disturbances include, for example, demand factors. In general, these misspeci…cations may result in biased parameters and processes. To shed light on these issues, Section 7 discusses in some detail extensions to the benchmark model.
The approach proposed here has some shortcomings but so do reduced form methods. 
Estimation
This section describes the data as well as the econometric approach used to estimate the multi-country model proposed in the previous sections. For each country in the sample, the parameter space is divided in non-estimated parameters
i and estimated parameters
h ;
n ;
[j] ;
# ;
[dj]
g ;
. The lack of indexation in the last three parameters re ‡ects the assumption that there is a common shock bu¤eting all SOEs. The parameter b
H is set to match the ratio of net exports to output observed in the data for each country. Without loss of generality, the steady state of labor is normalized to 1. This assumption in turn pins down the value for [j] . r is calibrated to match the average real interest rate in each country, which in turn determines the value of the discount factor . The remaining parameters in The data, which are described in the appendix, cover the period 1980Q1 -2010Q4. The observables included in the sample are real interest rates, the quarterly growth rates of percapita real output, consumption, investment, and the growth rate of exchange rates for the following developed economies: Australia, Belgium, Canada, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, and Sweden. As argued in Section 2, the assortment of countries in the sample shares a common stochastic trend. Furthermore, they are geographically located in di¤erent continents and export di¤erent goods. For example, Australia and Norway are big commodity exporters, while Spain relies on tourism and …nancial services. 7 Ultimately, one expects that these countries to be bu¤eted by shocks that are not necessarily correlated across 7 Norway's inclusion is of special interest because of its oil producer status. This feature implies that Norway's economic data can provide valuable information about oil shocks. To the extent that such shocks a¤ect economic activity (Hamilton, 2008), I consider that including Norway helps to better characterize the dynamic properties of the common shocks bu¤eting the countries in our sample. The alternative is to directly use oil prices. This approach, however, requires modeling the oil sector in some detail, which adds some unnecessary complexities to an already elaborated formulation. Why don't we include additional countries in the exercise? One reason is computational costs. As argued above, adding a country increases the size of the state space by 15%. More important, most of the remaining developed SOEs are located in Europe. Therefore, by including them in the estimation we risk recovering a regional shock common to all countries in the European area. The correlation of this disturbance with the remaining countries in the sample is most likely weak, which may lead us to conclude (incorrectly) that the factor is unimportant to, say, Canada and Australia. But this is problematic because we are interested in recovering a factor that is meaningful for countries in di¤erent geographical areas.
Alternatively, we could incorporate emerging economies into the analysis. Yet Aguiar and Gopinath (2007) forcefully argue that these economies display markedly di¤erent business cycles, which makes their inclusion unsuitable for our purposes. The priors imposed during estimation are reported in Table 1 . The prior mean g [%] is set to the average quarterly growth rate in percentage points across all countries and observables in the sample. The priors for the persistence parameters re ‡ect the view that the structural shocks display some autocorrelation. The relatively large standard deviation helps to account simultaneously for processes with low and high persistence. 
Results
In this section, the implications of the common factor are explored using a variance decomposition exercise and impulse responses.
A First Pass
Given the considerable attention that productivity has received in the recent SOE literature, Table 1 presents the posterior distributions for the country-speci…c productivity processes (upper panel) and the common productivity process, g w t (bottom panel). For completeness, the table also reports the estimates for some country-speci…c parameters such as habit formation, the cost of adjusting investment, and the parameters controlling the elasticities of substitution in the consumption bundles. A …rst pass at the results reveals that the growth rate of the common factor displays some mild persistence and that its volatility is bounded away from zero. This is an encouraging …nding because it suggests that the factor is statistically relevant. The average growth rate median is 0:24%, which is somewhat below the average quarterly growth rate across countries and observables in the sample.
But does the common factor's statistical signi…cance translate into economic relevance?
To answer this question, Figure 2 displays the …ltered common factor, b g w t , against several time series (the posterior modes are used to compute the implied factor). The upper left panel plots the factor (dotted line) and the unweighted average of the output growth rates in the sample (solid line). To facilitate comparison, the variables are demeaned and normalized so that their highest value is 1. Clearly, the factor does a good job tracking the major movements in the average growth rate, e.g., the contraction in the early 1990s, the boom in the middle and last part of the 1990s, or the small contraction in the early 2000s. Indeed, the correlation between b g w t and the average growth rate is 0:77 (a strong con…rmation of the relationship between those two variables). Put di¤erently, the model indicates that the average growth in the data is in part driven by the common technology disturbance.
The second panel shows the common factor against the average consumption growth rate. The co-movement is stronger than that of the average growth rate of output. The correlation is even higher at 0:92, which suggests that the common trend plays a very important role in accounting for the dynamics of average consumption in the sample. This result is expected once we recall that consumption is highly responsive to trend shocks (Aguiar and Gopinath, 2007) . The dynamics of the common factor and the average growth rate of investment are portrayed in the left lower panel. Although the factor tracks parts of the dynamics of average investment, it also misses the persistent decline in the early 1990s and the slow rebound during the Great Recession. This last observation is not that surprising once we recall that …nancial frictions were a main player in the recent crisis.
The …nal panel presents the common factor versus the average growth of exchange rates in the sample. Direct observation indicates that the factor is substantially less correlated with exchange rates (the correlation is 0:34). For example, the common element fails to track the sustained depreciation during the …rst half of the 1980s. As will become clear momentarily, shocks to the price of tradable goods account for a large fraction of the variability of exchange rates, which explains the low correlation. In sum, this simple exercise reveals that the model provides an adequate description of the data. Furthermore, the estimation approach indeed recovers a component that is common to all countries and, more important, this factor correlates well with economic activity.
On a closer inspection, Figure 2 indicates that the common factor also captures the crisis/recovery of the last few years. At face value, this …nding suggests that the recent global turmoil was triggered by a technology disturbance. This observation, however, needs to be quali…ed because most economic observers would agree that …nancial considerations played an important role in the crisis. Hence, it is plausible that the role of the common shock in recent years may be exacerbated by the lack of a fully- ‡edged …nancial sector in the model. In my view, the key insight from Figure 2 is that a shock common to all countries contributed to the recession in 2008 and 2009. Whether this disturbance was driven by technology, …nancial frictions, or both is a matter for future research. 8 To further illustrate my previous point, Figure 3 displays the growth rates in percentage points for the actual variables (solid lines) and those implied by the common factor (dashed lines). 9 If we look at the output series, it is clear that most of the contraction in Canada, 8 In principle, one could incorporate a …nancial sector a la Bernanke-Gertler in the model. However, the model already has many interesting dimensions, so a …nancial block would clutter some valuable insight revealed by the benchmark model. 9 To obtain these paths, the model was simulated using the …ltered common shock as the only disturbance and Sweden may be attributed to the common technology disturbance. In contrast, the shock overpredicts the recessions experienced by Australia and New Zealand. For these countries, it must be the case that idiosyncratic disturbances dampened the impact of the global shock. The investment series (last row) nicely exempli…es that the same shock can be asymmetrically ampli…ed in each economy. For example, whereas the decline of investment in Canada was predicted to be 7:2% at the trough of the recent recession, the estimated contraction in Australia was 9:4%.
When we turn to the country-speci…c productivities, two apparent patterns emerge from Table 1 : a) The tradable sector productivities are, on average, more volatile than those in the nontradable sector; and b) the tradable productivities display substantial persistence.
As explained in the next sections, this large persistence and volatility implies that the country-speci…c productivities explain a large fraction of the variability of output in the The estimated parameters also indicate that habit formation and costly investment are present in the countries, albeit to di¤erent degrees. For example, while Norway has the smallest adjustment cost of investment (0:21), the largest habit formation is present in Belgium (0:50). Norway's small cost is necessary to capture the large volatility present in its real variables. Similarly, the large habit persistence in Belgium is required to predict its smooth consumption pro…le (more on this in the next sections). When we turn to the other parameters in Table 1 to the common stochastic trend than Belgium. At face value, this …nding suggests that shocks to that trend have a disproportionally larger impact on Spain, which is consistent with the prolonged contraction experienced by the Spanish economy during the recent crisis. Finally, there is small variation in the elasticities of substitution between home and foreign-traded goods (1=1 % [j] ) and between traded and nontraded goods (1=1 [j] ).
Nevertheless these estimated values are consistent with those reported in Corsetti et al.
(2008).
Common Shocks or Idiosyncratic Disturbances? Variance Decomposition
The …rst panel in Table 2 presents the second moments predicted by the model as well as those found in the data (numbers in square brackets). 10 The …rst three rows correspond to the standard deviation of output growth and the volatilities of the growth rates of consumption and investment relative to that of output. The fourth and …fth rows display the standard deviations of the real interest rate and the exchange rate, respectively. The empirical moments display the usual patterns found in small developed economies: 1)
Output is more volatile than consumption but substantially less volatile than investment;
and 2) real exchange rates are more volatile than output. There are, however, other features worth stressing. Output in New Zealand is more volatile than output in the other countries.
Additionally, in Norway, consumption is more volatile than output. The combination of low habit formation and volatile preference shocks, j;t , in Norway induces the excess volatility. 11 From the households' …rst order condition, more volatile preference innovations distort the intertemporal substitution of consumption, inducing households to consume more up-front or to defer consumption for the future. In either case, the growth rate of consumption displays more volatility. In addition, if habit formation is su¢ ciently low, consumption volatility can be larger than that of output. To further illustrate this argument, I recomputed the second moments for Norway but set its habit formation to 0:5 and its preference volatility, # , to half its estimated value. Under this counterfactual scenario, the volatility of output drops to 1:63 while the ratio c = y is now 0:76. Clearly, the model predicts a smoother pro…le for consumption.
The second panel in Table 2 displays the fraction of the volatilities attributed to each structural shock. For example, Australia's productivity shock in the tradable sector, A H , explains 35% and 83% of the variability of output and investment, respectively. The row labeled g w reports the contribution of the common shock to the ‡uctuations in the model. For Canada, the common innovation accounts for 11%, 22%, and 12% of output, consumption, and investment, respectively.
Rather than further discussing individual outcomes, I …nd it more illustrative to highlight general patterns that result from the variance decomposition exercise. To begin with, the common productivity shock, g t , contributes more to the ‡uctuations of consumption than to those of output and investment. (The e¤ect on these last two variables is remarkably small in New Zealand and Norway.) Since the common productivity shock is permanent, households anticipate output to increase permanently in the future. This anticipation generates a wealth e¤ect that makes consumption contemporaneously rise by more than the initial response of output (Garcia-Cicco et al., 2010). It is precisely this initial spike in consumption that drives its large volatility following the common technology disturbance. In addition, the long-lasting feature of the productivity shock implies that the return to capital will be high in the future. Households feel no urgency to boost capital today and, as a consequence, investment is not very volatile in response to the shock.
Interestingly, the degree of trade openness has no impact on how the common factor in ‡uences a given economy. Belgium, a relatively open economy, is mildly a¤ected by shocks to the common trend. In contrast, the same trend shocks have a far larger impact on Australia, which is comparatively less open to trade. 12 Explaining this behavior is beyond the scope of this paper, but one may venture that Australia's dependence on commodities makes it more sensitive to worldwide ‡uctuations.
A second feature in Table 2 is that the common innovation is less important in those economies that are relatively more volatile, namely, New Zealand and Norway. Moreover, shocks to the common trend play a small role in accounting for the dynamics of output and investment in those countries. Third, interest rates and exchange rates are barely in ‡uenced by the common disturbance. Note, for example, that the shock explains only 2% of the movement in interest rates in Canada. Turning to the country-speci…c trend,
, we note that is only relevant for New Zealand's output, consumption, and investment.
Indeed, a back-of-the-envelope calculation reveals that this trend is required to generate the excessive volatility found in New Zealand's business cycles.
The numbers in Table 2 indicate that the productivity innovation in the tradable sector, A j H , is the only shock that explains a nontrivial fraction of the ‡uctuations in the observables. Furthermore, this shock accounts for a large fraction of the volatility of investment. This result is expected if one recalls that investment exclusively uses tradable goods. When we turn to international prices, note that shocks to the wholesale price of tradables, e p H;t , accounts for the sizeable share of the volatility of exchange rates. Indeed, those shocks explain 40% and 86% of the real exchange rate ‡uctuations in Norway and Australia, respectively. Interestingly, this …nding echoes the empirical results in other papers such as Engel (1999). 13 The tradable and nontradable technology disturbances also contribute to the dynamics of exchanges rates but to a lesser degree than shocks to the price of tradables. At face value, these …ndings suggest that supply-side innovations are important drivers behind exchange rates (a result consistent with the claims in Corsetti et al., 2008). Yet recall that e p H;t is exogenous, so it may well be that this shock captures nonmodeled demand-side innovations at home and abroad.
In sum, we observe that all shocks play an important role, to some degree, in the business cycles of the SOEs. Yet country-speci…c disturbances explain a substantially larger fraction of the countries'volatilities than the common productivity shock does. This pattern raises two relevant questions: 1) What accounts for the small explanatory power of the common shock in the model? and 2) How do the results from my approach compare with the related literature?
Intuitively, the small role of the common shock can be explained as follows. Figure 1 reveals that the data display co-movement but also substantial asymmetry at the business cycle frequencies. Hence, if the model has a chance to match the data, it must allow the country-speci…c shocks to account for the bulk of the ‡uctuations in the data. To this end, the estimated high persistence of the (stationary) tradable productivity disturbance, A j H , implies that its unconditional variance is substantially large. With the stationary and nonstationary productivity disturbances …ghting to explain the variability of output (they enter the model only via the production function), the large volatility of the former shock leaves little room for the common trend shock to account for the ‡uctuations found in the data. In contrast, less persistence and hence less volatility of A Using a dynamic factor model, the …rst authors report that 40% and 11% of the variance of the forecast error in Canada can be attributed to country-speci…c and international + " i;t . Here, E" i;t " k;t = 0 for i 6 = k, y i;t is the growth rate of either output, consumption, or investment; f wolrd is a factor common to all countries and observables; f country j;t is a country-speci…c factor; " i;t is an observable-speci…c disturbance, and the ! i 's are the factor loadings. These loadings capture the degree to which ‡uctuations in y i;t can be accounted for by each factor. 15 The contribution of each factor to the volatility of the observables is reported in the last panel of Table 2 . According to this decomposition, the world factor (f wolrd ) explains, for example, about 33% , 37%, and 15% of the volatility of Australia's output, consumption, and investment, respectively. By contrasting the results from Kose et al.'s method with mine, we can argue that about half of that 33% explanatory power for Australian output can be attributed to shocks to the stochastic trend. Similarly, our techniques downplay the relevance of the international common factor to explain the volatility of real interest rates and exchange rates. Indeed, these variables are mostly driven by country-speci…c innovations. Finally, according to the two decomposition schemes, the common (international) factor accounts for a smaller fraction of the business cycles of the most volatile countries, namely, New Zealand and Norway.
Common Shocks or Idiosyncratic Disturbances? Impulse Responses
To further clarify the importance of the common shock, this section reports the dynamic paths from the estimated model after a positive shock to the structural disturbances. All responses are expressed as percentage deviations from their trends (exchange rates are plotted as percentage changes from steady state). Figure 4 presents the impulse responses following a one-standard deviation shock to the common stochastic trend in the model (" g;t ). Because households anticipate the productivity shock to be permanent, they immediately raise their consumption by more than the initial response of output. Furthermore, households feel they will be wealthier in the future so leisure increases contemporaneously at the expense of lowering labor. For example, while consumption is initially 0:75% above its trend in Australia, its output level rises only 0:5%. In the long term, output, consumption, and investment in that country increase by 1:25%, which is consistent with the permanent e¤ect of a common productivity growth shock: (1 j ) g = 1 g . Figure 4 also reveals that there is substantial heterogeneity in the countries'responses even though the estimated stochastic process (equation 5) is the same for all the economies. This observation is accounted for by the di¤erent estimates of habit formation, the cost of adjustment in investment, and the weight of the common trend, j , reported in Table   1 . It is precisely di¤erent weights in the trend functions (equation 4) that account for the di¤erent long-term impact of the common productivity shock. More to the point, recall from the previous section that the parameters d [j] and { [j] are calibrated to match relevant data in each country. This asymmetry in some of the structural parameters necessarily changes the propagation mechanism of the trend shocks inside each country, which in turn explains the heterogeneous impulse responses. For example, the large initial response of investment in Norway is likely a consequence of the fairly low estimate for its adjustment cost function.
For completeness, Figure 5 presents the dynamic e¤ects of the other shocks in the model.
Output is more reactive than consumption to the stationary tradable and nontradable technology innovations. As explained above, the temporary nature of the shocks is behind this …nding. Interestingly, tradable productivity induces a highly persistent response in all variables, in particular consumption. This persistence results from the large estimates for [j] h recovered by the econometric approach. When we turn to the domestic trend shock, we note that it has a disproportionately larger impact on New Zealand, which is necessary to explain its more volatile business cycles. Table 2 , real exchange rates are driven by shocks to the terms of trade and innovations to the tradable and nontradable productivities. More important, while a tradable productivity shock appreciates the real exchange rates in all countries, a nontradable productivity innovation has the opposite e¤ect. 16 Since the terms of trade are exogenous, the appreciation following the tradable-sector productivity improve-ment entirely arises due to the Harrod-Balassa-Samuelson e¤ect. Finally, the responses to the premium and preference innovations are standard. For brevity, they are not discussed here, but the interested reader can consult the working paper version (Guerron-Quintana, 2010).
Consistent with the results in

Extensions
A clear message from Section 2 is that even after removing trends in the data, the SOEs tend to closely co-move over the cycle (see the HP-…ltered series in Figure 1 ). This observation suggests that the countries may be also sharing a stationary shock. For example, one can easily think of a common demand shock resulting from a worldwide decline in con…dence.
To explore this possibility, I introduce an additional common (and stationary) disturbance either in the production sector or in the demand side of the model. 17 The second moments in Table 1 indicate that Norway and New Zealand are substantially more volatile than the other economies. Hence, the second extension assesses the impact that the absence of those countries have on the estimated common factor. There is a concrete message from these alternative scenarios: Although common factors can account for up to one-third of the business cycles in the developed SOEs, a large part of their ‡uctuations is captured by domestically brewed elements. 18 
Common Stationary Productivity
To further study the impact of productivity, let us assume that the production functions are given by for the tradable and nontradable sectors, respectively. Note that the SOEs now share a common trend, X, as well as a stationary innovation, A w . Moreover, let log(A w t ) follow an AR(1) process whose persistence and volatility are given by A;w and A;w , respectively. Table 3 shows the variance decomposition under the new speci…cation. 19 Since the stationary common shock enters the economy solely through the production functions, it is hardly surprising that the new shock mostly contributes to the volatility of output. 
Common Demand Innovation
Suppose that the preference shock is composed of a country-speci…c part, j;t as in the benchmark model, and a common preference disturbance, w t . The utility function has the following functional form:
As with the other shocks, log( w t ) is assumed to follow an AR(1) process with persistence and volatility parameters given by ;w and ;w , respectively. The idea behind this new speci…cation is to factor in a common demand shock such as a global decline in con…dence or worldwide limited access to consumer credit. Ultimately, these events should manifest themselves as a contraction in demand at home. Table 4 reveals that the common demand shock accounts for a limited fraction of the business cycles. 20 As one may expect, the shock is relevant for output and consumption but not for investment. Overall, the main conclusions from the benchmark model remain almost intact. The only noticeable di¤erence is that country-speci…c disturbances are more important now for Spain than in the baseline formulation. From a variance decomposition perspective, the model with two common technology innovations seems to be the more relevant speci…cation toward understanding the business cycles in the developed SOEs.
Five Countries
Business cycles in New Zealand and Norway are clearly more volatile than in the other countries in the sample (see Figure 1 and Table 2 ). This observation suggests that the presence of those countries may dampen the role of the common factor while raising the relevance of country-speci…c shocks. To explore this possibility, I re-estimate the benchmark model but exclude New Zealand and Norway from the estimation. Two clear pictures emerge from the new exercise (Table 5 ). For Belgium, Canada, and Sweden, the international trend explains a fraction of their ‡uctuations that are slightly larger than in the baseline model. The …rst observation accords our intuition that the common trend shock should become more important once we remove the more volatile economies.
In contrast, the common factor accounts for a smaller fraction of their business cycles than in the benchmark speci…cation for Australia and Spain. Since New Zealand is a major trade partner of Australia, the reduced in ‡uence of the trend shock on this economy indicates that trade ‡ows between these countries are partially captured in the model through the common factor.
Concluding Remarks
This paper uncovers the presence of common factors driving ‡uctuations in developed SOEs. A novelty in the paper is that these factors are recovered using a DSGE model and Bayesian methods. When the data are expressed in growth rates, the common factor is identi…ed as a stochastic trend in the production function. Shocks to this trend explain on average 10% of the volatility of the growth rates of output and investment, respectively. Interestingly, those shocks explain roughly twice as much of the volatility of consumption growth as the volatility of output growth. In contrast, the common factor plays a small role in describing the dynamics of exchange rates or interest rates. TFP, preference, and terms-of-trade shocks explain the bulk of the volatility of output, consumption, investment, interest rates, and exchange rates. 28 1 Technical Appendix
Likelihood with One Common Factor
This section shows the structure of the matrices required for the state-space representation (Section 4). A 0 denotes a conformable matrix of zeros. Let P [j] be a diagonal matrix composed of the scalars n
[j] a ;
[dj] g o and partition the matrices [j] , [j] , and [j] as follows
Here, the matrices
s , and 
; = 2 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 4 ; where, G
g . The element g has not been indexed because it is common for both countries. H is a matrix of ones and zeros that selects the appropriate elements of S t needed to build the model's equivalent to the observables found in the data. This analysis can be easily extended when two or more countries are in the data. The 95 percentile probability interval is in square brackets. 
